tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8285737581949527996.post3536146472818515009..comments2023-10-11T09:14:08.345+01:00Comments on Pyjamas in Bananas: Trolley Problempjhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06832177812057826894noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8285737581949527996.post-3598158712271574512007-11-12T17:25:00.000+00:002007-11-12T17:25:00.000+00:00One perennial problem with utilitarianism is how t...One perennial problem with utilitarianism is how to calculate utility -- in particular, what's in and out of scope. <BR/><BR/>In the transplant case it seems to me that everybody's utility is decreased if they live in fear of being kdnapped and harvested for organs. That could far outweigh the utility of the five people whose lives are saved.<BR/><BR/>Perhaps it's because of things like that that we have the idea of rights; each person has a right to keep his/her organs regardless of who needs them, since if they didn't then we'd have big trouble (speaking purely in terms of utility, of course).<BR/><BR/>I wonder, though, whether a "calculation" of utility (not that we usually put a number on it) is really any more than a way of justifying our ethical intuitions, at least in cases like these...Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8285737581949527996.post-42649177994995896182007-11-05T23:37:00.000+00:002007-11-05T23:37:00.000+00:00Perhaps a philosophical basis to justify the insti...Perhaps a philosophical basis to justify the instinctive reaction lies in strong rule vs. weak rule utilitarianism. <BR/>The weak rule utilitarian judges each situation on an 'ad hoc' basis, identifying the greater happiness/utility, and perform actions consistent with attaining that happiness/utility. This does not account for what will result for future fallout from the action - which is where strong rule utilitarianism comes in. <BR/><BR/>In the case of the “Transplant/Trolley Problem”, being faced with a healthy if unsuspecting man, it might be justified to break him down for spare parts. However, if we perform the action presumably other healthy people will take umbrage, possibly exacting vengeance on medical personnel, and certainly discouraging them from going anywhere near a hospital. This will damage future the future happiness: so although in this case it might be justified in the short term, it would cause sufficient damage to a greater number of people in the long term. This would render it unjustified. <BR/><BR/>Troublingly, utilitarianism by definition values utility: this means that Singer can consistently advocate post-natal abortion, on the grounds that the live of some infants are not worth living. He argues [Practical ethics,1979] that given the arbitrary – in his view – division between a foetus being alive and not-alive, it may as well be 28 days after birth as 6 months before. He also advocates using “unwanted” infants for transplants, provided they are less than 28 days old (Practical Ethics, 1979 and to an extent expanded in Should the baby live? 1995)<BR/><BR/>Another fruitful route is to distinguish between action and inaction. Although one might argue – Singer does argue - that there is no distinction, this does not accord with the way our lives are lived. Indeed, it does not accord with the way his life is lived: if eating in a fancy restaurant whilst children in the third world starve is equivalent to killing them, Singers failure to live in a hovel and send all his excess salary to feed them renders him, by his own logic, a murderer. <BR/>However, if we accept there is a distinction between being not aiding someone and killing them, the problem disappears owing to the lack of moral equivalence.<BR/><BR/>The question no utilitarian can answer – “what action, regardless of its’ utility, would you never perform?”. However, most normal people have “red lines” that they will not cross.<BR/> <BR/>Sorry, I’ve wittered on a bit in this comment – hope at least some was of interest.Political Scientisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00763391741375972410noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8285737581949527996.post-88890206870549254912007-11-05T12:47:00.000+00:002007-11-05T12:47:00.000+00:00I'd forgotten about those ones - there's the disti...I'd forgotten about those ones - there's the distinction between gradual replacement and sudden replacement of the brain with silicon components that is supposed to probe our intuitions about personal identity and functionalism.pjhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06832177812057826894noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8285737581949527996.post-59378165996767310752007-11-04T22:14:00.000+00:002007-11-04T22:14:00.000+00:00I wouldn't underestimate the importance of whether...I wouldn't underestimate the importance of whether one can <I>really</I> (emotionally, subconsciously) believe in the terms of a thought experiment, as opposd to understanding them intellectually. I started wondering about this a propos of the various t.e.s about personal identity (you know, the variants of duplicating people and tele-matic machines and swapping brains (or, worse, brain information) over), but I think merits wider consideration. IMHO it is reasonably plausible that our reactions to t.e.s don't always genuinely take into account their terms.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com